by Jim Surkamp on July 4, 2018 in Jefferson County
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VIDEO: Click Here.
– (masshist.org).
– (nps.gov).
– (c-span.org).
– (Dennis Frye by Jim Surkamp).
JS: OK. Well, uh. I’m Jim Surkamp and this is Dennis Frye. His name is synonymous with the Maryland Campaign. If you notice my copy of Dennis’ new book – “Antietam Shadows” – seems well-worn.
DF: Mine is not as worn.
JS: (laugh) He didn’t have to read it. he wrote it. Let’s just start this way. This is a really impressive – really neat – book because it really wants to get to the bottom of things. That’s my impression. So we’ll just start this way. Dennis, the story of the Maryland campaign has been cemented into one perception that
– (masshist.org).
started with Francis Palfrey’s late 19th century’s book.
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James Murfin wrote the Gleam of Bayonets in 1965.
-(amazon.com).
and Stephen Sears’ – the big one – Landscape Turned Red. They all have nurtured us, taught us, convinced us that the real message of the Battle of Antietam that
-(wikipedia.org).
McClellan blew an opportunity to end the war because he was slow – specifically that he wasted eighteen hours after finding the contents of the Lost Order, written by Robert E. Lee. So we’ve all learned that. We’ve all been taught that, genuflected at the altar of. And you’re saying: “No!” That is not only distortion, It’s just not founded in fact. So, the biggest impression is that, and you’re making it very clear: McClellan had plenty of his foibles –
they’re well known – and he sure wished he burned his letters to his wife – but you make it clear (I never knew this) Lee was really positioned to go further west. He was in Hagerstown, which I didn’t know, and he was really planning to get into Pennsylvania and cause a headache for Lincoln during the elections.
– (wikipedia.org).
– (nps.gov).
– (nytimes.com).
– (loc.gov).
– (google.com/maps).
– (loc.gov).
– (wikipedia.org).
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And here’s something I never knew, you showed McClellan – we can say – “vexed” Robert E. Lee’s extreme left flank on the (September) the 16th – the night before the battle – and cut him off. That, basically, was the end of any attempt to move into Pennsylvania by first going west into Maryland. Can we just start there? Did I read it all wrong? Am I right or what? I’m very interested.
DF: Thank you Jim for the opportunity to discuss the book. I know you read it. It (JS’ book) is well used and well-worn. I really appreciate you diving deeply into it. First of all, let me put this in context, because context is really important. I don’t like George McClellan. I’ve spent over four decades bashing George McClellan. I have a reputation of being anti-McClellan. And, so anyone who reads this book and says: “Well, he’s flipped! He’s (DF) completely changed or he’s gone crazy,” doesn’t understand what I’m really doing. This is not a treatise on McClellan that is a pro-McClellan book. What I’ve done is and I think every good historian must do is constantly evaluate position, constantly ask themselves: “Is this right? Is this correct? Do I really believe this?” “What is the evidence that I’ve been using to back this up?” and challenge one self and constantly ask one self to evolve and not be afraid to change one’s position. So in this book, in many respects, I changed position. And I do that not because I suddenly had some lovefest with George McClellan, but because I’ve discovered evidence that’s counter to what I previously believed and what I previously preached. And so I’m not going to ignore the evidence. I’m not going to throw it away and say: “How cannot I not accept this? I’ve been wrong. So have so many others.” So, the whole premise of the book is “Don’t be afraid to challenge a historian.”
Historians very much pick and choose what facts they wish to present or story they wish to tell. Every piece of history is prejudiced by the historian. (JS: The narrative, seeking the narrative.) DF: And, so there’s a lot of prejudice and ill-will against McClellan. And, so the three authors that you mentioned – Francis Palfrey writing in the 1880s, James Murfin, whose book “Gleam of Bayonets,” whose book was published during the Centennial, and then Stephen Sears’ book came out in the early 1980s – all share what I call The Firm, what I refer to in the book as The Firm – Palfrey, Murfin and Sears – The Firm, and the perspective of The Firm and the opinion – and this is very important – the OPINION of The Firm is that McClellan screwed up, time and again.
It’s a hackneyed version of George McClellan always delaying, never moving, even having been given good information that he does not make good use of – and as a result, he doesn’t win the war. He doesn’t truly win the battle of Antietam. He doesn’t destroy Lee. This is the position of The Firm. That’s the position of the typical American public – that McClellan was an absolute failure.
McClellan had failings, but I argue in the book that so many of the failures that he is presented “as,” are not actual.
JS: What are some real examples of that? I followed up what your citations were in there and one big note that I noted was how Lee and (J.E.B) Stuart
-(wikipedia.org).
were very unequivocal in how fast the response was (McClellan after reading the Lost Order) And I’m going to add to that.
Do you think there was a lot of carry-over perceptions of McClellan at the Peninsula and earlier events which were misapplied to Antietam,
– (wikipedia.org).
– (wikipedia.org).
– (wikipedia.org).
– (loc.gov).
and maybe even Lee – he had his mistakes in the Maryland Campaign, but his persona favored. You know, there’s this carry-over of perceptions. What do you think of that?
DF: I don’ think there is any doubt. Your perception is correct. McClellan has not performed well in the Peninsular Campaign. McClellan is very slow and very deliberate and very methodical. And, of course, the numbers game where he postulates that the enemy’s numbers are greater than his own: he’s always out-numbered, he’s always demanding reinforcements. This is the persona that we’re so much familiar with. Every one of those aspects of his persona were applied to the Maryland Campaign, which came after the Peninsular Campaign. Well. that is not fair and actually is not accurate, because he performs differently – much, much differently – in the Maryland Campaign than he did in his approach to Richmond a few months earlier. And, so **this idea that the McClellan of the Peninsular Campaign is the same as the McClellan of the Maryland Campaign is a false narrative and is not true.**
JS: So we’re talking about this carry-over. And, of course, Lee was starting to look – Lee was enjoying the great Lee-Stonewall detente . . .
– (wikipedia.org).
– (wikipedia.org).
– (commons.wikimedia.org).
– (wikipedia.org).
and was having a string of victories and (they) were looking invincible. So the immediate backdrop was bumbling by the Federal commanders and Lee and Jackson at their best. DF: Lee and Jackson were at their best, absolutely at their best. This represents, perhaps, the zenith of Lee and Jackson.
– (wikipedia.org).
Now many historians would argue that the zenith of Lee and Jackson’s was at Chancellorsville. But again, I think that’s a false narrative. Jackson does not succeed at Chancellorsville. He does not break the Federal right. He never broke through, that’s the reason he was out reconnoitering that night as he was trying to figure out “where can I break them?” So although they (the Federals) did flee and run with the original surprise on the attack of May 2nd, the Federal right re-grouped and stands and doesn’t completely break. Jackson has partial victory. But here in the Maryland Campaign where we see them (Lee & Jackson) working so closely together and in the 2nd Manassas Campaign (the prelude to the first invasion) – that is Lee and Jackson together at their best.
– (civilwarscholars.com).
Jackson, of course, will have great success at Harper’s Ferry in this Campaign and a very, very, difficult assignment, an extremely difficult mission. Then fighting at Antietam, their tactical performance is brilliant at Sharpsburg. No question about it. But the impression of the Federals is that, there is chaos, there’s confusion, there’s consternation. There’s nobody in charge. There’s little control. And it’s not just in the Federal armies. That’s the United States’ political situation at this time. The Lincoln Administration appears, with this invasion: when Lee comes across the Potomac River and challenges the United States directly, boldly, forcibly, says: “Here I am. I dare you to stop me.” It makes the Lincoln Administration and the Republican Congress look absolutely imbecilic, incompetent. President Lincoln promised the war would be over in ninety days. President Davis, his counterpart and Confederate President, also promised the war would be over in ninety days. We all know how politicians are at predicting how long the war would last. So they’re both wrong. So now we’re entering our seventeenth month and we’ve killed over 200,000 people either through bullets and disease. We’ve maimed hundreds of thousands of others.
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The most famous song in the United States in September of 1862 is “The Vacant Chair.” It’s a beautiful song. It’s a song that pulls your heart. Obviously there were many dinner tables where there was a chair vacant. And that chair would never be filled again because there was an immense number of casualties that occurred; and so the Lincoln Administration just doesn’t look competent. It doesn’t appear that the end of the war is anywhere in sight. This is one reason for Lee’s invasion.
We shall meet but we shall miss him.
There will be one vacant chair.
We shall linger to caress him,
While we breathe our ev’ning prayer.
When a year ago we gathered,
Joy was in his mild blue eye.
But a golden cord is severed.
And our hopes in ruin lie.
We shall meet, but we shall miss him.
There will be one vacant chair.
We will linger to caress him,
When we breathe our ev’ning prayer.
Lee’s best chance for victory is by changing an election outcome
Lee wants to take advantage, not only of the chaos in the Union Army – there’s nobody in charge! There’s no commander at the time that he invades. But he also wants to exploit the political situation and Lincoln’s failure to bring an end to war that seems to now be endless.
JS: Isn’t it interesting that this is the first of three times that there was a serious Confederate incursion into Pennsylvania and we know that the first one – this one – and actually the third was in ’64 which was
– (wikipedia.org).
– (justjefferson.com).
– (bramptonguardian.com).
Jubal Early in Chambersburg and Monocacy. But they were so tied with the election result.
DF: especially in ’62 and ’64. There’s no question that General Lee, every day, knew that there
– (chicstypes.info).
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were Confederates north of the Potomac River are votes against Lincoln and the Republicans. More so, Gen. Lee’s objective, his principle goal for his army, is in September, 1862 was never Maryland. Maryland was a state that he intended to pass through, not fight in. His goal was Pennsylvania. He intended to take the Army north of the Mason-Dixon line, because Pennsylvania is where the real invasion begins, not Maryland. Pennsylvania is “Yankee country.” That’s the Northern state. That’s where they’re going.
JS: Did Lee have a written plan to President Davis, that said “my goal is to go to Pennsylvania”?
– (babel.hathitrust.org).
– (wikipedia.org).
DF: Yes, he actually sends a note to the President in which he says that he intends to take the Army into Pennsylvania, that is, unless the President objects. There was no objection, and so, not only were Lee and Davis on the same page,
– (chroniclingamerica.loc.gov).
– (Virginia Historical Society, Lora Robins Collection of Virginia Art).
the Confederate press and the Confederate Congress all supported this. There was a resolution in the Confederate Congress that applauds Lee for the invasion, supports the invasion, not as an occupation. That was not it’s purpose, but as an invasion into Northern territory to sway the Congressional elections of 1862. We must understand that the Republican hold on the Congress in the fall of 1862 had a very slim majority.
The other thing that we need to understand is that this is the first election in American history where the Republicans are trying to defend their congressional majority, the majority of the House. That’s never happened before. The first election where the Republican Party took control of the House – as the majority party – was in 1860. So this is the very time that many of these Republicans are up for re-election and it has not been a good two years.
JS: The more I listen, the more I feel that when someone says “Antietam and Maryland Campaign” it has been so grossly distorted into this one narrative and everything we’re describing is an overlooked narrative, that “We’re gonna go into Pennsylvania and affect an election” (but) the dominant impression is that they (Lee) went into Maryland and could have been beaten altogether. But this whole thing about going into Pennsylvania that has been massively supported and endorsed in the South, but you don’t read that. McClellan saw it and did something to stop it. But that’s the whole story that seems to have been sheared off from the story. Is that correct?
DF: It is. It has been sheared off. It has been ignored and it hasn’t been told. There is a reason for that. History didn’t happen like that. That was not the actual historical record. So, typically historians, typically only provide you the actuality, the historical record. I’d like to go beyond that.
There’s a great disadvantage to history and I talk about it in “Antietam Shadows.” The great disadvantage is, is that you and I know the end of the story. We know how the story finishes. I use an analogy; that is, like watching the Super Bowl, but you’re not there to watch it. You’ve been called away, you can’t watch so “I’m gonna put it on the DVR. I’m gonna tape it.” You’re driving somewhere. You have the radio on. All of the sudden the final score of the Super Bowl comes on. You say: “Oh NO! You just ruined everything! I didn’t get a chance to see the game. There’s no surprise. I know how it ends.” Well, you completely deflate when you know the end of the story. It’s like starting at the end of the movie, watching the end of the movie first and then going back to the beginning watching how you got to the end. That’s how history is presented. We always know the end of the story. So as a result, because the end of the story did not include Pennsylvania – Lee didn’t make it.
They didn’t talk about Lee getting into Pennsylvania because he doesn’t arrive there. He’s stopped. We never speak about that. It’s not recorded. I like to focus on as much of what didn’t occur as what does occur because history is not a single line. It is not a single arrow. There’s all of this that’s happening in the context of this actual historical moment. I like to bring in all that extra context so we can get a better understanding of what was happening for them at the moment at the time, as they saw it, as they were experiencing it, rather than us reflecting back on it, having this myopic focus only on the actuality. JS: So what I’m hearing is – when we’re trying to fashion a true context, what we seem to have to do is peel off all the lionizing or excoriating of individuals and you have to peel off all the biases of he victor maybe of the outcome. But what I’m getting at – was it Joseph Harsh? – Lee was making desperate decisions under desperate circumstances and actually even McClellan was. Of course, he (McClellan) put a nice face on it in his report later, but that’s what’s often overlooked. They were working on the fly at the moment; and as you said in your book, Lee asked Jackson to do the impossible. to go that fifty miles over two mountain ranges. By that time Jackson was (perceived) as invincible, but that was a mistake.
DF: Well we can look at errors that General Lee made, and he certainly makes errors in this Campaign and there has been some focus on errors that Lee has made. But where there has not been attention is “where did McClellan stop him?” McClellan has gotten no credit for stopping Lee. This isn’t one-sided. Lee doesn’t make it into Pennsylvania because Robert E. Lee makes a mistake. He doesn’t get into Pennsylvania because George McClellan stops him. That’s a story that’s never told because “McClellan can have no successes” – at least not based upon The Firm: Palfrey, Murfin and Sears. You can have no successes if you’re George McClellan. McClellan stops Lee; not just once, not just twice, not just thrice but, I would argue four different times. McClellan is very, very successful in stopping Lee’s initiatives.
CONTINUE to Part 2
References:
1. Frye, Dennis F. (2018). “Antietam Shadows: Mystery, Myth & Machinations.” Sharpsburg, MD: Antietam Rest Publishing.
amazon.com 12 December 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
2. Palfrey, Francis Winthrop. (1881).”The Antietam and Fredericksburg.” New York, NY: C. Scribner’s Sons. Internet Archives archive.org 26 January 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
3. LCol Francis Winthrop Palfrey – Antietam on the Web
antietam.aotw.org 3 June 2010 Web. 19 June 2018.
4. Murfin, James V. (1965). “The Gleam of Bayonets: Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign, September 1862.” Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University.
amazon.com 12 December 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
5. Sears, Stephen W. (1983). “Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam.” New York, N.Y.: Houghton-Mifflin, Inc.
amazon.com 12 December 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
6. Sears, Stephen W. (1989). “The Civil War Papers Of George B. Mcclellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865.” New York, NY: Ticknor & Fields.
amazon.com 12 December 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
7. In the Northern Virginia Campaign of August 1862 this stereotype did not hold true. Longstreet commanded the Right Wing (later to become known as the First Corps) and Jackson commanded the Left Wing. Jackson started the campaign under Lee’s orders with a sweeping flanking maneuver that placed his corps into the rear of Union Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia. The Hotchkiss journal shows that Jackson, most likely, originally conceived the movement. In the journal entries for March 4 and 6 1863, General Stuart tells Hotchkiss that “Jackson was entitled to all the credit” for the movement and that Lee thought the proposed movement “very hazardous” and “reluctantly consented” to the movement.[41] At Manassas Junction, Jackson was able to capture all of the supplies of the Union Army depot. Then he had his troops destroy all of it, for it was the main depot for the Union Army. Jackson then retreated and then took up a defensive position and effectively invited Pope to assault him. On August 28–29, the start of the Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas), Pope launched repeated assaults against Jackson as Longstreet and the remainder of the army marched north to reach the battlefield.
On August 30, Pope came to believe that Jackson was starting to retreat, and Longstreet took advantage of this by launching a massive assault on the Union army’s left with over 25,000 men. Although the Union troops put up a furious defense, Pope’s army was forced to retreat in a manner similar to the embarrassing Union defeat at First Bull Run, fought on roughly the same battleground.
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.
8. The Rapidity of Army Movements The News of the New-York Election, &c.
nytimes.com 12 November 1996 Web. 19 June 2018.
9. A Terminal Case of the ‘Slows’
By Rick Beard November 5, 2012 – Lincoln later described his decision (to fire McClellan) to his secretary John Hay. “After the battle of Antietam, I went up to the field to try to get him to move & came back thinking he would.” But, he said: “I began to fear he was playing false — that he did not want to hurt the enemy. I saw how he could intercept the enemy on the way to Richmond. I determined to make that the test. If he let them get away I would remove him. He did so & I relieved him.” To Francis Blair, Lincoln was more succinct: “He has got the ‘slows,’ Mr. Blair.”
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com 12 November 1996 Web. 19 June 2018.
10. Stephen_W._Sears
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.
11. Lyrics of George Root’s “The Vacant Chair”:
From “The Union” by Columbia Masterworks
We shall meet but we shall miss him.
There will be one vacant chair.
We shall linger to caress him,
While we breathe our ev’ning prayer.When a year ago we gathered,
Joy was in his mild blue eye.
But a golden cord is severed.
And our hopes in ruin lie.We shall meet, but we shall miss him.
There will be one vacant chair.
We will linger to caress him,
When we breathe our ev’ning prayer.At our fireside, sad and lonely,
Often will the bosom swell,
At remembrance of the story,
How our noble Willie fell.How he strove to bear our banner,
Thro’ the thickest of the fight,
And uphold our country’s honor
In the strength of manhood’s might.
We shall meet, but we shall miss him.
There will be one vacant chair.
We will linger to caress him,
When we breathe our ev’ning prayer.
Standard YouTube License
youtube.com 28 April 2005 Web. 19 June 2018.
12. The Chambersburg Raid of 1864
July 18, 2012 by John A. Miller
southmountaincw.wordpress.com 3 April 2013 Web 19 June 2018.
13. Official Record of the War Against the Rebellion
Volume XIX – Part II – Reports, September 20-November 14, 1862; Correspondence, etc., Sept 3-Nov. 14, 1862.
pp. 591-592 – Lee to Davis September 4, 1862
babel.hathitrust.org 5 December 2009 Web. 19 June 2018.
14. “First there was Scott, then McClellan, then Pope. But they have no match for the Southern military leaders in their armies, and if the result depends on superior generalship, the New York Times is right in its apprehension that the “rebellion will crush Lincoln.” More than all, Providence favors our arms, and a great and gallant people, inspired by a noble cause and sustained by the irresistible arm of the Almighty cannot be subdued.”
Richmond Dispatch, Friday September 12, 1862 p. 2
chroniclingamerica.loc.gov 3 June 2008 Web. 19 June 2018.
15. Lincoln: “He has got the slows, Mr. Blair.” Lincoln to Francis Preston Blair on November 6, 1862.
By early November, Lincoln had had enough and decided to fire McClellan. When Francis Preston Blair, a powerful ally and friend of Lincoln tried to talk him out of replacing McClellan, Lincoln told Blair that “[h]e had ‘tried long enough to bore with an auger too dull to take hold’ . . . He has got the ‘slows,’ Mr. Blair.’” (McPherson, James. (2008). Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief. New York: Penguin Books. p. 141). quoted in
Close Reading – Letter to George McClellan By Susan Segal, Understanding Lincoln, Summer 2013
dickinson.edu 22 December 1996 Web. 19 June 2018.
16. United States House of Representatives elections, 1862 and 1863
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.
Image Credits:
1. Title & Montage – They Got It Wrong FINAL
Dennis Frye – Jim Surkamp (Other image credits follow)
2. Montage – Frye They Got It Wrong – Frye Quote FINAL
Tom Clemens – Jim Surkamp
3. Lt. Col. Francis Winthrop Palfrey Carte de visite
Carte de visite by James Wallace Black, 1862.From the 20th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment carte de visite album.
Photo. 67.6. masshist.org 5 April 1997 web. 19 June 2018.
4. James V. Murfin
1929-1987 by Paula Degan
James V. Murfin (image Nancy Murfin)
nps.gov 13 April 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
4a. Gleam of Bayonets by James Murfin Book Cover
Murfin, James V. (1965). “The Gleam of Bayonets: Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign,
September 1862.” Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University.
amazon.com 12 December 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
5. Stephen Sears (Image)
c-span.org 18 October 1996 Web. 19 June 2018.
6. Book Cover of “Landscape Turned Red” FINAL
amazon.com 12 December 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
7. George B. McClellan Image by Mathew Brady FINAL
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.
8. Ellen Mary Marcy McClellan FINAL
Posted on 04/23/2009 by Maggie MacLean
Wife of Union General George B. McClellan
civilwarwomenblog.com 9 March 20198 Web. 19 June 2018.
RELEVANT BUT NOT USED
Maps of Washington county, MD
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018
Map – Part of Washington County, Md. “September 1862.”
Positive brown line print from original manuscript. Shows the area from Sharpsburg, Md. to Williamsport, Md. along the Potomac River. This item is in the Map Collection of the Library of Virginia; please contact the Library’s Archives Research Services department for more information. Available also through the Library of Congress web site as raster image. Oct. 2002; source unknown (1969);
Contributor: United States. Topographical Bureau. Date: 1862.
Part of Washington County, Md. Contributor Names: United States. Topographical Bureau. Created/Published:
[Washington, D.C.?] : Bureau of Topographical Engineers, 1862.
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
9. Montage Lee’s goal was Pennsylvania FINAL
9a. Montage Lee’s goal Pennsylvania outline FINAL
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.
9b. Montage Lee’s goal – Hex signs are among the wide range of decorative elements found on American barns. FINAL
Photo: NPS files.
nps.gov 13 April 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
9c. Montage Lee’s goal – New York Times November 7, 1862 FINAL
AFFAIRS AT HARPER’S FERRY.; The Rapidity of Army Movements The News of the New-York Election, &c.
nytimes.com 12 November 1996 Web. 19 June 2018.
9d. Montage Lee’s goal – General Robert E. Lee (1807–1870). FINAL
Library of Congress. Digital ID # cwpb 04402
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
10. Map of region Google Maps FINAL
google.com 11 November 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.
11. Map of Washington County, 1859 FINAL
A map of Washington Co., Maryland. Exhibiting the farms, election districts, towns,
villages, roads, etc., etc. Contributor: Taggart, Thomas – Downin, S. S. Created / Published – [S.l.],
L.McKee and C.G. Robertson, 1859
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
12. Montage Map of Washington County, 1859(Hagerstown); General Robert E. Lee (1807–1870). FINAL12a. Montage Lee/Hagerstown – Second flag of the Confederacy FINAL
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.13. Montage Hagerstown map, Confederate flag and Map Middleburg to Greencastle Franklin County 1858 FINAL
Map of Franklin County, Pennsylvania : from actual survey; Contributor Names: Davison, D. H.
Rease, W. H., Riley & Hoffman. Created / Published
Greencastle, Pa.: Published by Riley & Hoffman, 1858.
Phil’a [Philadelphia]: Lithographed, mounted, and varnished by W.H. Rease.
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.14. Don’t be afraid to challenge a historian FINAL
Children’s Book House by Olive Beaupre Miller
babel.hathitrust.org 5 December 2009 Web. 19 June 2018.14a. J.E.B. Stuart FINAL
archives.gov 31 March 2002 Web. 19 June 2018.
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.RELEVANT BUT NOT USED13214 Williamsport Pike Greencastle Pennsylvania
google.com 11 November 1998 Web. 19 June 2018.15. Montage Peninsula Campaign FINAL15a. Montage Peninsula Campaign of 1862 – map FINAL
PENINSULA CAMPAIGN MAP 1.
Date: 24 March 2010, 09:31:20
Source: United States, War Department. Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1891 (2 vols.).
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.15b. Montage Peninsula Campaign – Joseph Johnston FINAL
National Archives and Records Administration
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.15c. Montage Peninsula Campaign – George B. McClellan FINAL
Studio of Mathew Brady – 1861
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.15d. Montage Peninsula Campaign – Lincoln FINAL
[Abraham Lincoln]. Summary: Photograph shows full-length portrait of Lincoln seated at a table and leaning
on a book. Contributor Names: Gardner, Alexander, 1821-1882, photographer. .Created / Published
[Washington, D.C.], [9 August 1863]
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.16. Montage Title Lee & Jackson Successes16a. Montage Lee & Jackson Successes – Jackson FINAL
Confederate General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson.
Nathaniel Routzahn (1822 – 1908), Winchester, Virginia – Valentine Richmond History Center, Cook Collection
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.16b. Montage Lee & Jackson Successes – Map of Virginia 1862 FINAL
Source: United States, War Department. Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1891 (2 vols.).
archive.org 26 January 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.16c. Montage Lee & Jackson Successes – Cedar Mountain FINAL
Published by Currier & Ives, New York
Title: The battle at Cedar Mountain, Aug. 9th, 1862. Charge of Crawford’s Brigade on the right.
Date: between 1862 and 1872
commons.wikimedia.org 5 June 2004 Web. 19 June 2018.16d. Montage Lee & Jackson Successes – Battle of Bull Run/2nd Manassas
TITLE: The second battle of Bull Run, fought Augt. 29th 1862.
CREATED/PUBLISHED: New York : Published by Currier & Ives, [1862?]
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.17. Chancellorsville Battle Map FINAL
Hal Jesperson cwmaps.com 23 January 2012 Web. 19 June 2018.
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.18. Song “The Vacant chair,” or We shall meet but we shall miss him sheet music FINAL
The Vacant chair, or We shall meet but we shall miss him
Contributor Names
Root, George F. (George Frederick) — 1820-1895 (composer)
W., H. S. (lyricist)
Created / Published
Root & Cady, Chicago, 1863.
loc.gov 16 June 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.18a. Video recording of the song “The Vacant Chair”
Winboloer2, Published on Apr 20, 2009.
From “The Union” by Columbia Masterworks
Soloist: Peggy Zabawa
Standard YouTube License
youtube.com 28 April 2005 Web. 19 June 2018.19. Montage Early Burns Chambersburg July 30, 1864 FINAL19a. Montage Early Burns Chambersburg July 30, 1864 – Ruins FINAL
justjefferson.com 21 March 2004 Web. 19 June 2018.19b. Montage Early Burns Chambersburg July 30, 1864 – Jubal Early FINAL
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.19c. Montage Early Burns Chambersburg July 30, 1864 – generic flames FINAL
bramptonguardian.com 27 November 1997 Web. 19 June 2018.19d. Montage There were Confederates north of the Potomac & are votes against Lincoln FINAL
a. wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 2018.
b. rotunda ceiling of the Capitol building, Washington, D.C.
chicstypes.info 3 May 2007 Web. 19 June 2018.20. Montage letter Lee to Davis FINAL20a. Montage – letter Lee to Davis FINAL
Official Record of the War Against the Rebellion
Volume XIX – Part II – Reports, September 20-November 14, 1862; Correspondence, etc., Sept 3-Nov. 14, 1862.
pp. 591-592 – Lee to Davis September 4, 1862
babel.hathitrust.org 5 December 2009 Web. 19 June 2018.20b. Montage – letter Lee to Davis – Jefferson Davis FINAL
National Archives and Records Administration, cataloged under the National Archives Identifier (NAID) 528293.
Author: Mathew Brady
archives.gov 31 March 2002 Web. 19 June 2018.
wikipedia.org 27 July 2001 Web. 19 June 201821. Montage Confederate Confidence in 1862 FINAL21a. Montage Confederate Confidence in 1862 – the Richmond Dispatch FINAL
Richmond Dispatch, Friday September 12, 1862 p. 2
chroniclingamerica.loc.gov 3 June 2008 Web. 19 June 2018.21b. Montage Confederate Confidence in 1862 – Virginia Historical Society painting FINAL
Seven Bends of the Shenandoah River by William Winston Valentine.
– Virginia Historical Society, Lora Robins Collection of Virginia Art.